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 Abstract:  This paper estimates the dollar amount of public higher education subsidies 
received by U.S. youth and examines the distribution of subsidies and the taxes which 
finance them across parental and student income levels.  Although youths from high-
income families obtain more benefit from higher education subsidies, high-income 
households pay sufficiently more in taxes that the net effect of the spending and 
associated taxation is distributionally neutral or mildly progressive.   These results are 
robust to alternative assumptions and are consistent with Hansen and Weisbrod’s earlier 
celebrated findings for California, although not with the conclusions often drawn from 
those findings.  
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More than a quarter century ago, Hansen and Weisbrod stirred up a hornet’s nest 
of controversy by claiming that public support for higher education could well be 
regressive rather than progressive, and  therefore lead to a more unequal distribution of 
income.
1  Their case rested on the empirical observation that the distribution of benefits 
from higher education (in the California system which was the focus of their study)  
appeared to be more concentrated among the upper income households than did the 
associated tax burden.  The debate sparked by the Hansen-Weisbrod thesis made it clear 
that the task of assessing the distributional impact of public support for higher education 
is complicated not only by the usual problem of data availability and the thorny 
theoretical problem of tax incidence but also by disagreement about the appropriate 
measure of distributional impact for a policy that is both an inter- and an intra-
generational transfer.   
As Leslie and Brinkman￿s (1988)  survey reveals, a number of empirical studies, 
often for individual states, appeared in the years following the original Hansen-Weisbrod 
analysis.
2  However, interest in the redistributive aspect  of higher education finance 
seems to have waned in the 1980’s and 1990’s perhaps because of the seeming 
intractability of the question.  Kane (1999, p. 38) uses NPSAS (National Post-Secondary 
Student Aid Survey) data to show that high income youth receive roughly twice as large a 
subsidy as low income youth but Kane￿s analysis classifies students only by parent￿s 
current income and does not consider either taxes paid or the student￿s future income.   
Longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) used here 
                                                 
1 Some of the important contributions at the time were Hansen and Weisbrod (1969, 1971) , Hansen (1970), 
Hartman(1972), and Pechman(1970, 1972).  
2 An example is Moore(1978).   3
allows a more detailed tracing of the interrelationships between higher education 
subsidies received by individuals, their own lifetime income and their parents’ income.  
The data are used to estimate the distribution of higher education subsidies received by 
young adults and the taxes that finance them as a function of the various measures of 
their parents￿ income.  The subsidies net of tax can also be related to the younger 
generation￿s lifetime income, the dynastic income (parent and child) of the family, the 
parent￿s education and the young adult￿s academic ability.  
The first part of the paper sketches a theoretical framework.  The second part of 
the paper describes the data and the calculation of the subsidy measures used in the 
empirical work.  The third section looks at the distribution of subsidies by various 
measures of parent’s, student’s and dynastic income, by parent’s education and by 
student’s test scores.  My main finding is that while high income households receive 
larger benefits on average than low income households, the taxes they pay to finance 
those benefits are even greater, so that benefits net of taxes are not regressive ￿ low 
income households receive positive net benefits while very high income households 
receive negative net benefits.  Undeniably, the system would be more progressive if 
benefits were concentrated more on low-income households.  This finding is robust to 
consideration of  behavioral responses, liquidity constraints and externalities.  Finally, I 
reconcile my results with Hansen and Weisbrod’s earlier findings for California.   
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I. A  MODEL OF  REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS DYNASTIC FAMILIES 
 
As a simple starting point for the analysis consider a dynastic family with two 
generations each comprised of a single person.  The welfare of each family depends on 
the consumption and leisure enjoyed by each generation. Each generation can trade 
leisure for goods at its real wage rate.  The wage rate for the parent in family i, w1i, is 
exogenous in this model, while the wage for the second generation, w2i( ci) depends on 
the family’s choice of  investment in college education, ci . The functions w2i ( ￿ ) might 
differ across families because of differences in children’s ability, location, or other 
factors.  Investment in college is assumed to be non-negative with variation capturing 
both the extensive (time) margin and the intensive (quality) margin. The price per unit of 
college investment, pc , is relative to the consumption good numeraire, as are wages.  
Finally, each family is endowed with initial wealth, Ii.  
Government taxes the wage income of each generation at the respective 
proportional rates of t1 and t2  and spends on public goods (assumed never to affect the 
decisions modeled here) and college tuition subsidies. The subsidies are discounts, at rate 
s, from the full cost of college, permitting parents to purchase c units of investment in 
college for a cost of  (1 ) c cp s ⋅⋅ −.  The government faces a long-run budget constraint 
and can borrow or lend at the interest rate, r. 
Each family’s indirect utility can be written as a function of the parameters of its 
budget constraint: 
  { } 11 2 2 ,( 1) ,( ) ( 1 ) ,( 1) ii i c VIw t w t p s −− − i  (1)   5
Underlying the function V  are labor supply choices in each generation, a college 
investment choice, and borrowing or saving. 
The policy experiment is a balanced budget move from a vector of tax rates and 
no tuition subsidy ( t1, t2, 0) to another vector of tax rates and a subsidy rate of s: (t1 + ∆t1, 
t2 + ∆t2, s) .   The compensating variation measure of the effect of this policy change on 
family i , CVi , is the amount of money that restores the household to its original level of 
well-being: 
{ } { }
** *
11 2 2 11 1 2 2 2 ,( 1) ,( ) ( 1) ,( 1) ,( 1 ) ,( ) ( 1 ) ,( 1) ii i c i ii i c V I wt w t ps V I C V wtt w tt ps −− − = + − − ∆− − ∆ − ii
 (2) 
where the asterisks indicate the possibility that policy changes affect market wage rates  
and the price of college education.   
    
 Redistribution without Behavioral Responses or Borrowing Constraints 
Most of the empirical results presented in this paper are estimates of  the 
distribution of these compensating variations across families, computed under the 
assumption that subsidies and taxes do not affect behavior and that households can 
borrow or lend at the government interest rate, r.   The CV measure of tax and subsidy 
policies in the zero sum case  will simply be the present discounted value of the subsidy 
received by a family less  the extra taxes paid by both the parent￿s and the child￿s 
generation.: 
  [ ] [ ] 11 1 2 2 2 () ( ( ) ) ii i i i i i c CV PDV H w t w c H t PDV c p s − = − ⋅ ⋅∆ − ⋅ ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅  (3) 
In (3), Hji represents the exogenous labor supply of generation j in family i, while ci is the 
amount of college chosen by family i. The difference between (2) and (3) reflects the   6
assumption that wages and the price of college are unaffected by the policy, that labor 
supply, hence earnings and leisure, are unaffected by the policy, and that the absence of 
borrowing constraints ensures that family utility is a function of leisure and discounted 
income.  Since leisure is unchanged, the effect of the policy is just the change in 
discounted income.   Market wages and prices will be unaffected because no household 
changes its behavior. 
  The government budget constraint,  that discounted tax revenue  equals the 
government￿s discounted subsidy payments, implies that the sum of CVi over all families, 
I, is just zero.  The total tax burden on all families is just the total cost of the subsidy 
received by all families.  To use the NLSY data set, which looks at a sample of a subset 
of all families, namely those with children born between 1957 and 1964, I need to assume 
that the subsidies received by this subset of families are financed by taxes imposed on the 
same subset.  That is, if we think of this subset of families as a cohort, I want to abstract 
from intercohort redistribution and focus on intracohort redistribution. 
To see that this necessary restriction is not unreasonable, imagine a steady-state 
population consisting of many identical cohorts, born at different times, each with the 
same lifetime distribution of earners and college subsidies.  Since each cohort has the 
same distribution of earnings, taxes  paid by each cohort are identical. And since each 
cohort has the same distribution of college subsidies, subsidies received by each cohort 
are identical.  These assumptions imply that the government budget constraint must be 
satisfied within each cohort; that is, the discounted taxes paid by a cohort must equal the 
discounted subsidy received by a cohort.  In other words, there can be no cross-cohort   7
subsidy when each cohort is identical.
3  Given these assumptions, summing (3) over all 
parents in a particular birth cohort (say parents of seventeen year olds in 1980) yields an 
expression which is the present value of subsidies received less the present value of 
additional tax revenues paid by that cohort.  By the government budget constraint, this 
must equal zero.  Hence, the sum of compensating variations within a cohort (and its 
progeny) is zero; losses exactly offset gains within a cohort.  
The fact that families can borrow or lend at the government interest rate also 
implies that  the Barro neutrality proposition holds here.  It makes no difference how the 
tax burden is spread across generations (within families) because families can undo the 
effects of any particular government financing scheme.  Moreover, the dynastic family 
model makes it clear that the appropriate measure of distribution effects is the extent to 
which the policy affects the long-run welfare of families rather than the short-run income 
of particular generations.  Previous studies have attributed the benefits of public 
universities to the current annual income of parents of current students at such 
universities, while the costs were assigned by the annual income of the taxpayers in 
general.  Since parents of college age children may be near their peak earning years, 
attributing the subsidy received by their children to that income may overstate the extent 
to which these subsidies benefit upper income families. 
To summarize, in the base case when no efficiency effects are allowed, higher 
education policies are zero sum.  These policies will be judged to be progressive if higher 
income families as a group pay more in taxes attributable to the policy than they receive 
in benefits.  All families who do not directly partake of the benefits will be worse off. By 
                                                 
3 The same proposition holds even with growth in earnings over time and growth in the subsidy over time   8
assuming a steady state with identical cohorts, all redistribution occurs within a cohort, 
not across them.  
 
Redistribution with Behavioral Responses and Borrowing Constraints 
  The above scenario will strike most readers as unrealistic because tuition 
subsidies are intended to affect college-going behavior, overcoming borrowing 
constraints or offsetting externalities.  How should the gains and losses to particular 
households be accounted when behavior is affected by the tuition subsidy ? To tackle this 
question, consider first the case in which the demand for college responds to  tuition 
subsidies but without the additional complication of borrowing constraints or 
externalities.  Figure 1 shows a downward sloping demand for units of higher education, 
denoted as c, as a function of the price per unit faced by students and their families. The 
supply is assumed to be infinitely elastic.  With no tuition subsidy,  the price is pc and the  
amount consumed is c*.  When college is subsidized at the rate  s, the net price to the 
demander becomes pc(1-s) and c rises by 
* ccc ′ ∆ =−.  The benefit of the subsidy to the 
family is the additional consumer surplus, or the shaded area in figure 1, which is clearly 
less than the dollar cost of the subsidy,  c sp c ′ ⋅ ⋅ .  If we assume a constant elasticity of 
demand for college of η (in absolute value), the benefit of the tuition subsidy can be 
expressed as a function of η, s and the dollar cost of the subsidy.
4  To illustrate how the 
dollar cost of the subsidy will be adjusted to account for behavioral response,  when the 
                                                                                                                                                 
as long as the growth rates are equal. 
4 It is straightforward to show that the benefit of the subsidy as a fraction of the dollar cost of the subsidy is 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ss s
η η ⎡⎤ −− − − ⎣⎦ .   9
subsidy rate, s, is .9, and the demand elasticity, η, is 0.15, the benefit of the subsidy is 
about 80% of its dollar cost.  
  Suppose that subsidies are introduced to offset borrowing constraints.  How can 
we now measure the benefits of tuition subsidies to households ?  Consider Figure 2 
which depicts two curves ￿ the true marginal value of higher education to the family and 
student and a lower curve which represents the actual demand for higher education as a 
function of the price faced by the family.  The effect of borrowing constraints is that the 
family  does not purchase education up to the point where the price equals its true 
marginal private value.  Hence, when the price is  c p  , for example, the household 
purchases only c* units, leaving some potential gains unexploited. 
  It is convenient to parameterize the extent of borrowing constraints in this figure 
by the parameter v which is the vertical distance between the two curves.  Borrowing 
constraints cause a household that faces a price of p to act as though it maximizes facing 
a  price of p + v.  In the figure, the household facing a price of  c p  chooses an amount of 
education, c*, which is the amount it would choose if it maximized net benefits and faced 
a price of  c p v + . 
  Now consider the effect of a subsidy a rate s. The net price falls to p(1-s) and the 
household now chooses c′.   The figure shows the case where the subsidy is not 
sufficient to completely offset the borrowing constraint, that is  c sp v ⋅ <   The additional 
consumer welfare is shown by the shaded area, which is seen to be greater than the dollar   10
cost of the subsidy.
5    When  0 v =  ,  the benefit expression reduces to the simpler 
formula derived above. 
  To evaluate this expression, we need to know the extent to which actual subsidies 
offset the borrowing constraints.  When the subsidy is optimal and just offsets the 
borrowing constraint so that students choose the optimal amount of education,  c sp v ⋅=  , 
and the private benefit now exceeds the dollar cost of the subsidy.   To illustrate the size 
of the adjustment to dollar cost implied by borrowing constraints, with a subsidy rate of 
90% and a demand elasticity of 0.15, the benefit of an optimal subsidy will be 109% of 
its dollar cost. 
  These results will allow us to adjust the dollar subsidies, which we can observe, to 
reflect changes in household welfare, using information about  the size of the subsidy, the 
elasticity of demand and assumptions about the size of borrowing constraints.  However, 
to be consistent, I also need to adjust the dollar tax burdens to reflect the excess burden of 
the taxes used to finance the tuition subsidies which can be done using estimates of the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation.     
 
II.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT OF SUBSIDY 
The NLSY Data Set 
  The NLSY data set is a well-known panel data set, which has followed, since 
1979, a group of young adults born between 1957 and 1964.  Information on college 
                                                 
5 The ratio of benefits to dollar cost are now equal to 
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attendance is quite complete and the data includes reasonably good adult earnings 
information, as this group was in its thirties at the time of the last wave of questioning in 
1996. The NLSY sample contains both a representative sample, and additional 
oversamples of blacks, Hispanics and low-income whites. All of the results in this paper 
use only the representative sample. 
 
Computing the college subsidy 
  The ideal measure of the total higher education subsidy received by each NLSY 
sample member would be the sum for all colleges and universities he or she attended of 
the difference between the costs attributable to that person’s attendance and the student’s 
(or parent’s) payment of tuition and fees to the college or university.  This would 
represent the net cost to others (outside the family) of that individual’s higher education.  
In the case of public higher education, the subsidy from the taxpayers is direct; in the 
case of private higher education institutions, the subsidy is derived from donors whose 
donations, and the return earned on the funds thereby endowed, enjoy favorable tax 
treatment. As a result, part of this private subsidy is actually an indirect  public subsidy 
through the tax treatment of charitable donations and non-profit private institutions.   
The measure actually used is derived from the HEGIS/IPEDS data on the finances of 
higher education institutions collected annually by the U.S. Department of Education.  It 
compromises in the following ways with the ideal described above: 
•  The subsidy (costs of attendance less tuition and fees) is computed as student 
instructional costs and institutional financial aid less total tuition and fees 
divided by total enrollment for the year and the higher education institution in 
question. Excluded from the subsidy calculation are capital costs, which are   12
both difficult to measure and, more importantly, problematic to attribute to 
current or past taxpayers or donors.  Gordon Winston (1995) and Winston and 
Ivan Yen (1995) show that the neglect of capital costs understates subsidy 
amounts by approximately 25%, with modest variation across types of 
institutions.  Applying a uniform understatement factor to the subsidy measure 
used here and assuming that all costs are paid by current taxpayers, yields 
distributional effects that are basically similar to those presented here.  Hence 
I conclude that a thorough treatment of capital costs would probably not 
appreciably change the results. 
•  To simplify, the subsidy assigned an individual is that for the last 
undergraduate institution attended. Thus, if an individual attended X State 
university for 1 year, followed by attendance at Y State University for 3 
years, I attribute to this person 4 years of receipt of the annual subsidy rate of 
Y State U. Consequently no-one will be recorded receiving both a public and 
a private subsidy.   
•  Post graduate attendance is ignored  
•  The subsidy for undergraduate attendance is limited to four years. If someone 
attended for more than four years before receiving an undergraduate degree, 
that person is assumed to have received four years of subsidy, under the 
presumption that they received the equivalent of four years of subsidy spread 
over more calendar years. 
•  Individual receipt of financial aid is not accounted for specifically in the 
subsidy computation because the NLSY has sketchy data on the amounts of 
financial aid received.  Each student is implicitly assigned average per 
student financial aid for that institution. Since within each institution 
financial aid is inversely related to family income, this simplification reduces 
the apparent progressivity of the system. 
•  Individuals attending U.S. military academies are excluded from the analysis 
because the subsidy as computed does not account for the substantial service 
obligation incurred by these students.  
    13
Some of these data compromises are motivated by a desire to simplify the 
calculation of the subsidy; others are necessitated by the lack of information in the 
NLSY.   
 
III.  THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIES ACROSS STUDENT AND PARENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Table 1 presents the basic facts of the distribution of higher education subsidies 
across NLSY panel members. Over half of the sample received some higher education 
subsidy; the mean subsidy received (conditional on receiving a subsidy) was $8129 in 
1982 dollars.  Public higher education institutions are attended more frequently than 
private so a much higher fraction of the sample received public subsidies (recall that I am 
computing undergraduate subsidies only and am assigning all years attended to the last 
institution attended.)  Males and females receive roughly similar subsidies; males are less 
likely to attend but are more receive slightly higher subsidies when they do.  Blacks and 
Hispanics overall are less likely to attend but receive roughly similar subsidies if they do.     
 
Subsidies and Current Parent Income 
For a subset of the NLSY sample,  a measure of  parent income when  panel 
members were from 16 to 18 years old is available.  Table 2 presents the distribution of 
higher education subsidies received by deciles of parental income.  As previous 
commentators have observed, children of higher income families receive greater public 
higher education subsidies than do children of lower income families.  Moving from the 
bottom income decile to the top, the fraction of youth receiving such subsidies rises from   14
about 1/4 to about 1/2 and the mean value of the subsidy, conditional on receiving one, 
doubles.   
Private subsidies are more dramatically concentrated among the children of higher 
income families, though some lower income students receive considerable private 
subsidies.  Private subsidies, which are financed by donations past and present to private 
institutions, are also relevant to policy discussions because of the tax preferences given to 
charitable contributions, the earnings of endowment funds of private colleges and 
universities, and the real property of private colleges.  The tax subsidy to private 
institutions will be included in some of the calculations to follow.  The final three 
columns in Table 2 describe the distribution of total subsidies, public and private, across 
parent annual income deciles. 
  The data in Table 2 allows a calculation of the net redistributive effect of higher 
education policy as measured by the taxes paid by parents and the subsidy received by 
their NLSY children.  Let us consider first only direct public subsidies (taxpayer support 
of public institutions) and assume that marginal changes in public expenditure on higher 
education are financed with taxes that are proportional to income. Public higher 
education subsidies are financed largely by state governments, who rely on income taxes 
and sales taxes for revenue. Fullerton and Rogers ( 1993) find that state income taxes are 
progressive while state sales taxes are regressive. Overall proportionality is probably not 
a terribly inaccurate assumption.   
Since the average public subsidy is almost exactly 10% of average parents￿ 
income, a proportional income tax of 10% would finance the entire public higher 
education subsidy. The overall pattern is shown by the light gray bars in Figure 3.    15
Families in income deciles 1, 2,  3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 receive more in subsidy than they pay in 
tax while families in the remain income deciles ( 4, 9, and 10) pay more than they 
receive.   Since decile 4 pays only slightly more than it receives, the overall redistributive 
effect of the policy would appear to be progressive.    The  top two deciles pay more in 
tax than they receive in subsidy, while the reverse is true in general for the bottom eight 
deciles.  Of course there is also redistribution within income deciles with some families at 
all income levels benefiting directly from higher education subsidies and others  paying 
taxes but not receiving benefits. 
  The darker bars in Figure 3  add the additional indirect tax subsidy to private 
institutions to the direct tax subsidy for public institutions.  I approximate the net tax 
subsidy to private institutions as 40% of each dollar spent.  The three principal tax 
preferences are deductibility of charitable donations, the exclusion of endowment 
earnings from taxation and the exemption of real property from property taxation.  The 
first preference alone would imply a subsidy equal to the donor’s marginal tax rate, td.  
The second implies that a dollar donation to an endowment buys a perpetuity of r dollars 
a year, while if the endowment interest were taxed at the rate tr and the original donation  
were not deductible, the annual income stream endowed by a dollar gift would be 
r(1-td)(1 - tr). Setting td = .28 ( a common marginal income tax rate) and  tr =  .35 (the 
corporate income tax rate),  each dollar of non-profit endowment earnings is subsidized 
by 53.2 cents of tax reduction.  Hence, 40% is a conservative estimate of the subsidy to 
private institutions, at least when donations are used to fund endowments.  The overall 
pattern of progressivity is not greatly affected by the addition of the indirect public 
subsidy of private institutions.   16
   
Approximating the Distribution of Net Benefits by Parents’ Permanent Income  
For several reasons, the calculations in Table 2 and Figure 3 might seriously 
misrepresent the redistributive effect of public higher education subsidies. In what 
follows, I attempt to address some of these issues.  
Distribution of Children vs. Distribution of Parents 
Since the sampling frame of the NLSY is designed to replicate the children￿s 
generation, not the parent￿s generation, parents with many children are overrepresented 
and parents with few children are underrepresented.  If high income parents have more 
children than low income parents, the calculations above will overstate progressivity by 
understating the benefits received by high income parents relative to low income parents.  
This flaw can be partially corrected by using information on the number of siblings of 
each NLSY respondent and weighting the benefits received by each parent by the total 
size of the family.  The expected value of benefits received by a family with n children is 
just n times the expected per child benefit. The actual benefit received by the NLSY child 
is an unbiased estimate of the family￿s per child benefit.  For example, a two child family 
in which one child, the NLSY panel member, is observed receiving a $5000 public 
subsidy, would be estimated as having received $10,000 in public higher education 
subsidies.  This is only a partial correction because families with no children are 
completely unrepresented in the NLSY.  The failure to include adults who never have 
children overstates progressivity only if such adults have lower incomes than the median 
observed household.  However, data from the June, 2000 Current Population Survey 
shows that across all household income levels, roughly the same fraction of women, 35-  17
44 years old, are childless.  This implies that the income distribution of childless women 
is roughly the same as the income distribution of women with children, so the omission 
of childless households does not obviously bias the estimated progressivity of tuition 
subsidies.  
Life Cycle Income Patterns 
The parent￿s annual income when the child is age 17 misrepresents the family￿s 
permanent income because of well-known patterns of  earnings and income over the life 
cycle.  Parents of seventeen-year-olds may be close to their peak earning years and it is 
well known that life cycle earnings growth is greater for highly educated workers. The 
dispersion of  the annual income of parents at that stage of life cycle would overstate the 
dispersion of lifetime income and could misrepresent the progressivity of higher 
education subsidies. 
I deal with this issue by linking each family’s annual income to the estimated 
lifecycle earnings patterns estimated by Murphy and Welch (1990).  This amounts to 
assuming that each household’s income profile follows the average pattern for households 
with that household’s characteristics.  Using a 3% real discount rate, the present 
discounted value of these lifecycle income profiles can be computed. 
The results of  these two adjustments (family size and lifetime income) are 
shown in  Table 3 and Figure 4.   The mean subsidy values represent subsidies per 
household, not child, and so are much greater than those in Table 2, though the pattern of 
subsidies by income (Table 3) and the net subsidies (including the proportional tax 
assumption) shown in Figure 4 look quite similar to the data already presented for annual   18
income and per child subsidies.  Apparently, these two modifications do not significantly 
affect the overall pattern of subsidy and net subsidy. 
Adjusting Lifetime Income for Transitory Effects 
As is well known, transitory fluctuations in income imply that the dispersion of 
current income overstates the dispersion of permanent income.   This could bias the 
apparent progressivity of  subsidies upward because taxes are assumed to be proportional 
to lifetime income. If annual income, or even lifetime income pegged to annual income, 
overstates permanent income for upper income households, then too much tax would be 
imputed to these households  while too little is imputed to low income households whose 
actual lifetime income will be understated by annual income.  
To adjust for transitory effects,  I used estimates by Moffitt and Gottschalk (1994) 
of the relative variances of transitory and permanent earnings by education level to form 
a weighted average of predicted permanent income and the family’s actual transitory 
income.  Specifically, suppose that the income of household  i in year t, Yit , is a linear 
function of observables, Xit, plus a permanent family fixed effect, ￿i, and  a transitory 
shock, eit. 
  it it i it YX e β µ = ++ (4) 
Let the weighting factor, w , be the share of transitory variance in the total error variance: 
  [ ] var( )/ var( ) var( ) we e µ =+  (5) 
The proposed estimator of  it i X β µ +   is  then 
 (1 ) it it wY w b X − +  (6) 
where b is the estimate of β from an OLS cross section regression of equation (4).  If all 
variance is transitory, w = 1, and the estimator of permanent income is the prediction of   19
the cross section regression ( no need to worry about unobserved heterogeneity).  If all 
the variance is permanent heterogeneity, however, then w = 0 and the estimator is 
observed income of the household.  "Adjusted lifetime income"  takes the value 
computed by (6) and adjusts by the same Murphy-Welch profiles described above to 
estimate discounted lifetime income.  
 The results of these additional adjustments are shown in Table 4 and the first four 
columns of Table 5.  As Table 4 shows, adjusting for transitory variance compresses the 
income distribution.   Since taxes are again assumed to be proportional to lifetime 
income, this reduces the share of total taxes paid by the upper deciles of the income 
distribution but not enough to reverse the progressive pattern of the policy as shown by 
Figure 5.  In order to assess the statistical properties of the pattern depicted in Figure 5, 
Table 5 presents regression estimates of the adjusted income decile pattern of net 
subsidies.  In column (1), I regress net direct subsidy only on income decile dummies 
omitting the lowest decile. Most of the higher deciles receive smaller net subsidies than 
does the bottom decile, with the top two deciles receiving significantly less subsidy, both 
in an economic sense and in a statistical sense.  Column 2 of Table 5 estimates the same 
relation with three covariates -- the child’s AFQT score, the parent’s combined years of 
education, and a dummy variable for black.  Because parents’ education and AFQT are 
strong predictors of college attendance and are positively correlated with parent’s income, 
their addition to the equation makes the net subsidy received by high income families on 
the basis of their income alone even more negative.  The positive coefficient on black in 
this regression may be surprising but it reflects the fact that black students are more likely 
to attend college than white students, holding constant family income and academic skill.   20
As in the previous figures, the concept of the direct and indirect public subsidy adds 
the implicit public subsidy of private institutions and the taxes which pay for that subsidy 
to the direct public subsidy already discussed.  Results using this subsidy concept are 
shown  as the dark bars in Figure 5 and the regression results in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 5.  The results confirm the progressive nature of higher education subsidies. 
 
Distributions by Dynastic Income 
   The presence of data in the NLSY on both parent’s income and child’s income as 
a young adult allows an approximation of dynastic income, or the discounted sum of 
parent’s and child’s lifetime income.  The child’s lifetime income is estimated by applying 
the Murphy-Welch trajectories and the Moffitt-Gottschalk variance decompositions to the 
latest three observations on the child’s income as an adult. Table 6 displays these 
distributions.  As was the case with adjusted lifetime income, while high income 
dynasties enjoy greater public subsidies than lower income dynasties, the distribution of 
mean subsidies is not as unequal as the distribution of mean dynastic income.  Private 
subsidies are more focused on the very top decile but are also substantial for low income 
dynasties.  Figure 6 displays the net subsidy calculations, when taxes are assumed to be 
proportional to dynastic income.  Here the top decile appears to be, on net, subsidizing 
the college expenses of the lower nine deciles, but curiously the ninth decile receives the 
greatest positive subsidy.  The regression results in columns (5) - (8) of Table 5 confirm 
that the top decile’s net subsidy is large and significantly negative, while the ninth’s is 
strongly positive. 
   21
Distributions by Child’s Lifetime Income 
  Another distributional perspective  argues that the parent’s income is irrelevant.  
Since the child is the beneficiary of the subsidy, the appropriate distributional analysis 
compares net subsidies received across the distribution of the child’s lifetime income. The  
tax burden for the subsidy is then assigned to the child’s lifetime income.  One could 
imagine the costs of educating the child’s cohort being financed by borrowing, with the 
debt repaid by levying taxes in the future on the income of that cohort.  Figure 7 displays 
the distributional pattern of subsidies by deciles of  child’s lifetime income.  Clearly, the 
pattern of mild progressivity exhibited by other income measures is preserved here.   
   
Distributions by Parent’s Education and Child’s Academic Skills 
Table 7 shows the distribution of subsidies by parents’ education, which is defined 
simply as total years of education by both parents. .  Parents’ education is likely to be a 
rough proxy for the household’s permanent income and data on it is available for many 
more NLSY panel members than parents’ income.
6  Notice that public subsidies are 
highly skewed toward the children of well-educated parents.  The income of the top 
decile in this distribution is only twice the income of the bottom but the children of the 
top decile receive four times the direct public subsidy and 32 times the private subsidy 
obtained by the children of the bottom decile. 
Figure 8 shows the net redistributive effect of direct and indirect subsidies across 
deciles of parents’ education, again assuming proportional taxation.  The income measure 
in  Figure 8 is lifetime income, the same as in Figure 4, but the estimated distributive   22
effects are dramatically different. Evidently parents’ education has such a strong effect on 
childrens’ college attendance ( and quality of college) that the children of highly educated 
parents receive more subsidy than their parents pay in taxes. So even if higher education 
subsidies do not redistribute from the poor to the rich, they do redistribute from the less 
educated  to the more educated.  The contrast between the results for parents’ education 
and parents’ income make clear that while income and education are correlated, the 
correlation is far from perfect.     
  Table 8 reveals the distribution of total subsidy received by a family by the 
academic skills of its NLSY participant, where academic skill is measured by the score 
on the AFQT .
7  As expected, higher education subsidies are highly skewed toward those 
with academic skills.  Parents of  children with great skills receive more in subsidy than 
they would pay in proportional taxes to finance such subsidies. The income of parents of 
children at the bottom decile of the skill distribution is about half the lifetime income of 
parents of children in the top decile of the skill distribution, but the latter group receives 
fifteen times the public subsidy and forty times the private subsidy of the parents of low 
skilled children. 
Caveats 
No matter which definition of income is used, or whether the focus is parents’ or 
students’ income, the implication of the results above is that the net redistributive effect 
of public subsidies for higher education is either distributionally neutral or mildly 
progressive.  On the other hand, the subsidy strongly redistributes toward the families 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Data on parents’ income was available only for the younger members of the sample, who had not reached 
the age of 18 when the panel began. 
7 The AFQT score is standardized for the age of the student taking it.   23
with well-educated parents or intellectually able children.  The reason for the 
progressivity is that while subsidies are larger for higher income families, a proportional 
tax system means that taxes are even higher.  While we are used to thinking of benefits as 
regressively distributed if high income households receive more benefit than low income 
households, the net impact of a policy is the difference between benefits and costs.  
Hence an equal payment to all households financed by proportional taxes is progressive.  
It is worth recapitulating some of the limitations and  biases of the procedure.  
Progressivity is probably understated because the subsidy measure does not include the 
intra-institutional distributional effect of  financial aid  which is undoubtedly progressive. 
Instead,  because my subsidy measure is computed as per student costs less tuition 
receipt, financial aid is in effect allocated equally to all students.   
The simplifying assumption of a proportional tax system has been adopted.  This may 
not be a reasonable assumption for marginal changes in tax revenue, even if it 
characterizes the overall tax systems of many states.  Georgia’s HOPE scholarships are  
financed by a state lottery which is not close to a proportional tax.  One could compute 
exactly how regressive a state tax system would have to be to push the net redistributive 
effect into regressivity.  To illustrate, in the case of the parent’s lifetime income (Table 3, 
Figure 4), the tax system would have impose tax rates 3 times as high on the bottom two 
deciles as on the top two deciles in order to make the net subsidy distributionally neutral.  
Fullerton and Rogers( 1993, p.174) find that while sales and excise taxes are regressive, 
the ratio of the effective tax rate faced by the bottom 20% of the population to the rate 
faced by the top 20% is on the order of  1.2, nowhere near the degree of regressivity 
needed to reverse the conclusions above.   24
 
Behavioral Responses 
  How robust are these results when behavioral responses are considered ?  Table 9 
presents results using the adjusted lifetime parental income measure of the first column of 
Table 5.  To adjust for behavioral responses, we need to estimate the shaded areas in 
Figures 1 and 2 and that requires an estimate of the subsidy rate, s, and the demand 
elasticity, η.  Winston, Carbone and Lewis (1998) estimate the subsidy rate for public 
higher education institutions in the mid 1980￿s at about 90%, so I use  0.9 s = .  For the 
elasticity of demand for higher education with respect to net tuition, I rely on two sources 
which yield similar estimates.  Leslie and Brinkman (1988., p 132) present a metaanalysis 
of demand studies from which they conclude that the enrollment rate falls by .7 
percentage point for each additional $100 in net tuition.  Using this response, along with 
information about enrollment rates and tuition in the mid 1980￿s, I conclude that η = .13.  
Kane (1999, pp 114) estimates an enrollment effect of 5 percentage points per $1000 in 
tuition in the early 1990￿s, which implies an η = .15.  Finally, a consensus estimate of the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation in the 1980￿s based on work of Ballard, Shoven and 
Whalley (1985) and Browning (1987) is 15%, implying that a dollar of tax revenue 
imposes a burden of $1.15. These three parameter values underlie the results in Table 9. 
  The first column reproduces the net subsidy results underlying the first column of 
Table 5.  This is a zero-sum case with no behavioral responses to taxes or subsidies. The 
second column shows the effect of behavioral response to subsidies with no borrowing 
constraints; here the value of the subsidy is .8 of its dollar cost, so the sum of net 
subsidies is negative, but the effect is still progressive with the lowest decile gaining and   25
the highest income deciles losing. Column (3) shows just the effect of tax distortions 
while column (4) considers both subsidy and tax distortions. Finally column (5) assumes 
that the subsidy exactly offsets borrowing constraints which face the bottom five deciles 
of the income distribution.  While this is a case which would seem to be most favorable 
to finding progressivity of subsidies, the bottom five deciles actually lose on net because 
what they gain from the subsidies is more than matched by their loss from the taxation 
that finances those subsidies. Still, the effect of the policy is progressive in the sense that 
the highest deciles lose the most in percentage terms. 
 
IV. COMPARISON WITH HANSEN AND WEISBROD   
  Can these results be reconciled with the famous study by Hansen and Weisbrod 
(1969) that found the California higher education system to be regressive ?   Perhaps no 
reconciliation is needed.  Hansen and Weisbrod studied one state, California, in the 
1960’s, while this study  encompasses the entire nation and looks at students who 
attended college primarily in the 1980’s.  It is also possible, though implausible, that 
California’s system is regressive while other states’ systems are progressive.  It is also 
possible that the progressivity of the entire system rose between the 1960’s and the 
1980’s.  But a simpler reconciliation is possible if we ask the same questions of the data 
in this study that Hansen and Weisbrod did of their data. 
  The limitations of the data available to Hansen and Weisbrod led them to analyze 
the problem in the following way.  They divided the population of California families 
into four groups, corresponding to the level of higher education institution attended by 
the family’s child.  Some families have no children in the university system, some have   26
children in junior  college, some in state colleges , and some with children in UC 
campuses. These four groups represent an ascending order of gross subsidy, as UC 
students receive more subsidy per year and spend more years in college than junior 
college students.  What Hansen and Weisbrod showed was that, comparing these four 
groups of parents, gross subsidy was positively related to both mean household income 
and to net subsidy.  That is, the parents of the UC students have both the highest family 
incomes of the four groups and receive the greatest net subsidy, when their tax burdens 
are accounted for.  Families with no students in the system have the lowest incomes and, 
of course, receive negative net subsidies since they enjoy no direct benefit and must pay 
taxes to support the system. These empirical patterns led Hansen and Weisbrod to 
conclude,  
"..on the whole, the effect of these subsidies is to promote greater rather than less 
inequality  among people of various social and economic backgrounds, by making 
available substantial subsidies that lower income families are either not eligible 
for or cannot make use of ￿"(1969, p. 191) 
 
  Table 10 describes an exercise parallel to Hansen and Weisbrod’s using this 
study’s data.  Households are arrayed by level of gross public subsidy .    Decile 10 
corresponds to those households receiving the most gross subsidy; they have the highest 
mean incomes and receive the greatest net subsidies.  The bottom five deciles are lumped 
together as they are families who receive no direct subsidy because their NLSY  child did 
not attend a public institution. If one looked only at Table 10, one might conclude, as 
Hansen and Weisbrod did, that the system is regressive.  However, as we know, the same 
data generated the progressive patterns revealed in the Figures 3 through 7.   27
  It may appear paradoxical that net subsidy and income can both be positively 
correlated with gross subsidy, as Table 10 shows, yet net subsidy and income are 
negatively correlated with each other.  A simple numerical example shows how this can 
happen. Suppose half the families have high incomes of $10000, while the other half 
have low incomes of $2000.  Suppose that if a child goes to college, the gross subsidy is 
$6000; the alternative is not going to college, where the gross subsidy is 0. Proportional 
taxes on income are levied to finance the system, and 30% of high income families’ 
children go to college, while only 20% of low income children go to college.  In this 
economy, the average household income of children who go to college is $6800, 
compared with only $5733 for non-college goers.  The average net subsidy received by 
college goers is $4300, compared with -$1433 for non-college goers.  Yet, average net 
subsidy received by high income households is -$700, compared with +$700 received by 
low income households. 
8 The key is  the 70% of high income households who pay 
substantial taxes, yet have no children receiving subsidies. 
  Since the overall redistributive effect of a policy is revealed by the pattern of net 
subsidy across income levels, one could conclude that  Hansen and Weisbrod got the 
numbers right but drew an incorrect conclusion of regressivity from their evidence. 
 
V.   FINAL COMPLICATIONS: CHANGES IN PRICES AND EXTERNALITIES 
   
Changes in Prices 
                                                 
8 This basic pattern holds for a wide range of assumptions about the income distribution and the proportion 
of  children from each income level going to college, as long as high income children are more likely to go   28
  The recent work of Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) has emphasized the 
effect of subsidies in changing market prices.  In this model, two important prices that 
could be altered by tuition subsidies are the price of college, pc, and the second 
generation’s wage function, which could become flatter as the real wage of the less 
educated rose and the real wage of the more educated fell. Such a change in relative 
wages would augment the progressivity of a tuition subsidy policy.
9   The price of college 
might also rise as input suppliers such as college professors earn greater rents.  This price 
change would likely reduce progressivity if faculty have higher incomes than the families 
of their students. However, in 2000-1, the average faculty salary at four-year institutions 
was around $59,000, while the median family income of freshmen at four-year 
institutions was reported to be roughly $64,000.
10  Hence there is no strong evidence that 
student￿s parents are poorer than faculty, although the salary figure is not family income. 
 
Externalities 
  If college educations for some confer benefits on others, a complete reckoning of 
distributional effects should include these externalities, both real and fiscal.  A fiscal 
externality arises because those who are induced by subsidy to acquire college educations 
will, on average, pay more tax and receive less transfer payments.  A real externality 
occurs if the pre-tax incomes of non-college educated workers rise when more workers 
attend college. Externalities of either variety, in the absence of other complications to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
to college. 
9 George Johnson (1984) is a particularly compelling version of this argument. 
10 Chronicle of Higher Education, August 31, 2001, pp 23, 27.  The median freshman family income was 
found by interpolating a uniform distribution between $60,000 and $75,000.   29
basic model, make a tuition subsidy a positive-sum policy and alter the pattern of net 
benefits by income class.   
Reasonable assumptions about the nature of externalities lead straightforwardly to 
the conclusion that externalities will reinforce the progressive distributional effects found 
in the basic model. Here, a policy is called progressive if the relative inequality of income 
is reduced by the policy, that is, if the policy raises the income of low-income households 
by a greater percentage than it raises the income of high-income households.  A policy 
could reduce relative inequality, therefore, while still raising the dollar gap between the 
incomes of rich and poor.  To make the point requires some algebra. Indexing income 
deciles by k, let Bk, Tk and Nk denote respectively the average benefit received by 
households who receive positive direct benefits, the average tax paid per household and 
the fraction of households who receive positive benefits. With this notation, the average 
net benefit received by households in income decile k is just the difference between 
benefits received and taxes paid, or kk k NB T ⋅ − .  As we have seen, these net benefits in 
the simple model have been positive for low-income deciles and negative for the very 
highest income deciles. 
To account for the distributional impact of externalities we need a reasonable and 
simple way to allocate externalities across households.  Fiscal externalities ￿ higher 
future tax revenue attributable to the policy ￿ reduce the incremental lifetime tax revenue 
needed to finance the policy.  Let us simply assume that the tax reduction attributable to 
the fiscal externality is the same fraction, e, of each household￿s incremental tax burden   30
in the simple model.
11 The net benefit received by income decile k is now equal to  
kk k k NB T e T ⋅−+ ⋅  .  If e = 0, we are back in the simple model without externalities.  If e 
= 1, the tuition subsidy is self-financing ￿ it generates enough incremental tax revenue to 
pay for itself.  In the self-financing case,  non-beneficiary taxpayers invest in the college 
educations of others and will earn the market rate of  return on that investment in the 
form of higher net taxes paid by the direct beneficiaries of subsidies.  Note that when e = 
1, the distribution of net benefits is the same as the distribution of gross benefits, since 
there is no extra tax required to finance the policy.  As Tables 2,3, and 4 show,  gross 
benefits are absolutely higher, but a smaller percentage of income,  for high income 
deciles. Therefore, when externalities are so large that  e = 1, tuition subsidies reduce the 
relative inequality of income.   Since we have already shown that when e = 0 and we are 
back in the simple model without externalities, tuition subsidies reduce relative income 
inequality,  any value of e between 0 and 1 will also reduce relative inequality. 
12 
What if the externalities are not fiscal externalities but real externalities raising 
the earnings of non-recipients?  Again, a reasonable and simple assumption is that the 
real externality is the same proportion of every household￿s income. Using this 
assumption, we get the same result that we above with fiscal externalities.  Suppose the 
real externality parameter is e*, so a household with income Y receives an externality 
benefit of e*Y.  Since incremental taxes have assumed to be proportional, this gives the 
same pattern of benefits as the fiscal externality analysis, since T = tY and eT = etY = 
                                                 
11 I am ignoring the timing of the future tax revenue.  One could imagine the government borrowing now to 
reduce current tax burdens, paying off the debt with the future tax revenue generated by the additional 
college graduates. 
12 This result is easy to show using the fact that the net benefit for any value of e between 0 and 1 is just a 
weighted average of the net benefits at e = 0 and net benefits at e = 1.   31
e*Y, where e* = et and t is the proportional tax rate.  Hence assuming fiscal externalities 
are proportional to incremental taxes and assuming real externalities are proportional to 
income yield the same distributional impact, which is to reduce relative income 
inequality.  
In most models of real externalities (see Acemoglu and Angrist(2000) or 
Moretti(2004) ), the wages of non-college workers are increased more by an increase in 
the number of college graduates than are the wages of college graduates.  This would 
suggest that e* is higher for low income deciles than for high income deciles, and the 
tuition subsidy would be even more progressive.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
  This paper takes two approaches to the question of the distributional effect of 
higher education subsidies. The first approach neglects the resource allocation effects of 
subsidies and the taxes levied to pay for them, and treats higher education policy as a 
zero sum game. The costs and benefits of public subsidies can be allocated across various 
concepts of parent income, parent education and student ability.  In this framework, 
higher education subsidies clearly redistribute toward highly educated parents and parents 
of able children.  With respect to redistribution by parental or student lifetime income, 
however,  the evidence for a range of alternative income concepts shows the effect 
subsidies net of the taxes which finance them as mildly progressive or roughly 
distributionally neutral.  Although high income families receive more in subsidies, they 
pay sufficiently more in taxes that the net subsidies for high income households are   32
negative,  while those for low income households are on average positive. This basic 
result holds up even when we consider behavioral responses to subsidies and taxes. 
Since my conclusion conflicts with the results of Hansen and Weisbrod’s justly 
famous 1969 study,  I apply their methodology to my data and derive results parallel to 
their findings.  A reasonable conclusion might be that Hansen and Weisbrod￿s  results 
were incorrectly interpreted as implying the regressivity of subsidies.  Although those 
who receive higher education subsidies are from higher than average income families, 
and those families do not pay in tax the cost of educating their children, it is still the case 
that  all high income families considered together (including those with no children 
receiving subsidies) are receiving negative net subsidies. Low income families, taken 
together, receive positive net subsidies. Higher education subsidies benefit upper income 
households more than lower income households, but when the taxes that finance the 
subsidies are accounted for the net effect is somewhat progressive or at least not 
regressive.   
The data for the results in this paper pertain to college finances in the 1980￿s 
leaving open the possibility that the distributional effect of the public higher education 
financing system has changed in the intervening two decades.  For example, the rise of 
merit aid (such as Georgia￿s HOPE scholarships) and the decline of public university 
tuition subsidies would make the current system less progressive than the one described 
here.    
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Table 1: Distribution of Subsidy to Higher Education Across NLSY Sample  
 
 
Distribution of Public Subsidy 
Distribution of subsidy if subsidy > 0  (1982 dollars)    Percent 
receiving 






Total Sample  41.6%  7784 5493 2392  11281
Males:White 41.1%  8240 6229 2569  12126
     Black  27.2%  6171 4126 2051  8885
     Hispanic  26.9%  8000 6433 3115  11134
Females: White  43.9%  7418 5207 2270  10368
      Black  35.8%  6614 4446 1858  8222
      Hispanic  32.5%  10161 4808 2632  12121
 
Distribution of Private Subsidy 
Total Sample  12.1%  9324 4693 1771  10188
Males: White  11.2%  8848 4673 1849  8125
     Black    9.5%  15373 8591 2099  22389
     Hispanic    8.5%  7237 6516 4456  8173
Females: White  13.3%  9532 4815 1618  10495
      Black  10.0%  6114 2516 1354  5338
      Hispanic  10.1%  14234 12256 4108  26552
 
Distribution of Total Subsidy 
Total Sample  53.7%  8129 5337 2208  11101
Males: White  52.3%  8370 5750 2346  11746
      Black  36.7%  8553 4359 2099  10561
       Hispanic  35.4%  7816 6433 3115  11134
Females: White  57.2%  7909 5090 2145  10381
     Black  45.8%  6505 3997 1800  8112







Notes:  Based on cross-section portion of NLSY sample, excluding military academy graduates.  Subsidy 
is difference between per student instructional expenses and average tuition and fees.   
 






Table 2: Distribution of Subsidy by Family Annual Income When Student Age = 17 
 
 







































































value   
Mean 
if > 0 
1  6736  26.6 1555  5849 5.4 622 11499 32.0 2178  6805
2  13670  34.4 2176  6318 7.5 778 10315 41.9 2954  7036
3  19408  35.8 2902  8100 11.5 1385 12029 47.3 4287  9056
4  23934  35.4 2263  6391 13.0 1998 15318 48.4 4261  8794
5  27961  46.8 3272  6991 6.8 392 5731 53.6 3664  6830
6  32167  45.0 3314  7371 9.6 594 6207 54.6 3908  7167
7  36290  47.4 4022  8481 13.9 996 7149 61.3 5018  8179
8  41988  48.6 4467  9177 11.7 998 8541 60.3 5466  9054
9  50974  52.0 4339  8341 17.4 1881 10803 69.4 6221  8958
10  73092  47.0 4944  10510 25.8 2673 10374 72.8 7617  10462








































































































1 89046 33.3 7352 6.7 2112 40.0  9464
2 175136  35.7 10869 9.1 2874 44.8  13743
3 232792  38.6 10575 10.3 4490 48.9  15065
4 279144  36.9  7440 14.1 8902 51.0  16342
5 320589  54.3 14785 7.3 1493 61.6  16278
6 363942  47.5 12317 12.1 1705 59.6  14022
7 406737  48.7 14361 13.5 3250 62.7  17611
8 468666  48.2 13606 14.1 3214 62.3  16820
9 563173  51.7 14514 19.1 3995 70.8  18509











Notes:  Lifetime income is approximated by linking empirical age earnings profiles to observed annual 
income when NLSY panel members were 17; the number reported is the present discounted value in 
1982$ using a 3 percent real discount rate.  Total subsidy for a family is the subsidy attributed to the 





























































































1 179507  34.7  7562 5.4 1187 38.1  8749
2 235938  27.6  5779 11.7 1961 36.7  7740
3 270614  41.2  9082 8.9 5591 52.3  14673
4 298638  36.0  7856 13.4 7727 46.7  15583
5 326360  46.8 11738 8.1 2493 55.0  14231
6 358179  46.8 15346 10.1 2635 62.8  17981
7 392700  55.2 12946 13.9 1814 59.4  14760
8 431047  52.2 18228 14.5 2625 73.7  20853
9 488049  54.5 16643 12.3 3838 69.1  20481
10 625440  48.3 19045 30.7 11061 79.6  30106




Note:  Lifetime income is adjusted by averaging lifetime income from Table 3 with 
predicted income from a regression of lifetime income on parent characteristics 
(education, race, location, occupation)   with weights equal to the relative permanent and 
transitory variances , as a fraction of total variance,  by education level. ( Moffitt and 
Gottschalk, 1994) Table 5:  Net Subsidy by Income Deciles: Regression Results 
(Huber-White standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Adjusted Lifetime Income  Dynastic Income 
  Net Direct Subsidy  Net Direct and Indirect Subsidy  Net Direct Subsidy  Net Direct and Indirect Subsidy 



























































































































































































Observations  1691 1610 1691 1610 1658 1582 1658 1582 
 
Note:  ** = 95% confidence  
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of Total Subsidy by Dynastic Income  
 
 







































































1 358265  20.6  4450 5.6 1298 26.2  5748
2 536185  28.2  6373 10.5 6741 38.7  13114
3 649997  39.1 10564 10.2 5243 49.3  15807
4 751978  44.1  9351 9.2 1961 53.3  11312
5 850167  41.5 10132 11.6 2306 53.1  12438
6 947823  47.5 10792 11.4 3408 58.9  14200
7 1051828  52.7  12889 15.3 3643 68.0  16532
8 1186134  54.0  14199 13.8 2717 67.8  16916
9 1386893  60.7  22195 16.3 4420 77.0  26615
10 2658674  56.2  24244 25.1 9552 81.3  33796




Note:  Dynastic income is the present discounted value of parent’s and child’s lifetime income.     41
Table 7: Distribution of Total Subsidy by Parents￿ Education 
 
 
























































































1 264118 21.3  6091 3.6 505 24.9  6596
2 280624 29.2  8231 7.7 2395 36.9  10626
3 314998 34.2  7587 6.7 1925 40.9  9512
4 325507 34.9  7296 7.7 1735 42.6  9031
5+6 363278 42.4 10954 9.6 1652 52.0  12606
7 365878 52.7 12637 10.4 3487 63.1  16124
8 420757 57.8 16427 15.5 3603 73.3  20030
9 416404 62.6 21638 22.6 4819 85.2  26457
10 505076 56.0 25198 33.9 16785 89.9  41983






Note:  Parental education is the sum of years of schooling of the student￿s parents. In deciles 5 and 6,  both 
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Table 8: Distribution of Per Family Subsidy by Student￿s Academic Ability 
 
 





















































































1 219071 8.9  1647 1.7 392 10.6  2039
2 283020 18.3  3192 1.9 394 20.2  3586
3 295183 26.3  4953 3.5 645 29.8  5598
4 341174 31.4  5672 5.0 1101 36.4  6773
5 342654 39.9  6761 5.7 1034 45.6  7795
6 352433 47.3 13006 11.7 2022 59.0  15028
7 399817 51.2 15413 9.4 2394 60.6  17807
8 404330 56.7 18230 17.2 3728 73.9  21958
9 421840 64.6 23262 22.2 5734 86.8  28996
10 436777 58.4 23829 33.6 17401 92.0  41230

























Income  Decile  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
1 2410 823 1581  -5 2216
2 -423 -1859 -1564  -3000 -989
3 718 -1212 -622  -2553 150
4 -595 -2481 -2099  -3986 -1344
5 -692 -2766 -2351  -4424 -1522
6 2125 -740 294  -2573 -2571
7 2217 -928 190  -2955 -2955
8 197 -2837 -2049  -5083 -5083
9 -1999 -5062 -4597  -7660 -7660
10 -3958 -7775 -7414  -11232 -11323
       
Subsidy  Response   X  X  X 




     X  
 
 
Notes: Income measure is adjusted lifetime family income. Elasticity of demand = .15,  subsidy rate = .9, marginal welfare cost of taxation = .15. For column 













Net Subsidy  Gross Subsidy 
1-5 30694  -3124 0
6 34208  -2685 838
7 32228  -1492 1722
8 33888  754 4127
9 34048  5029 8603

































































Pc + v 
true marginal 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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